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The Advantages of Incumbency,
Candidate Image, and the Vote
by
Jonathan Mott

Candidate image is an important predictor of voting behavior in congressional elections.
Voters usually compare the qualities ofboth candidates and choose the candidate that they perceive
to be best. The evidence provided indicates that incumbents have an advantage under normal
circumstances, in establishing, reinforcing, and maintaining positive images of themselves in the
minds of the electorate. The source of this advantage for incumbents is the result of privileges
and the amount of time they can devote to campaigning. However, the decisive advantage of
incumbency is money. Incumbents raise and spend a great deal more money than challengers.
Incumbents are also able to utilize various mediaforms more extensively than challengers to build
positive images among voters. Further evidence is provided to show that once images are established,
incumbents fare even better, because these images become more stable and harder to change.
Public financing of elections, not term limits, is probably the best way to make congressional
elections competitive again.
Incumbents win because Americans despise Congress but love their particular Congressman,
who toils tirelessly to deliver services. Incumbents are entrenched by democratic choices, and
Americans have a constitutional right to democracy, not good government.
George F. Will
Introduction

In the boxing matches of congressional
elections, the weathered, reigning champions
usually come out on top. The young, bushytailed challengers often find out only after
stepping into the ring that they never had a
chance. More often than not, the champ,
flexing huge muscles of money and the perks
of office, soundly defeats all-comers. Indeed,
the matches fought in the ring are usually nocontest affairs.
It hasn't always been this way though.
There once was a time when the champ would
voluntarily step out of the ring, leaving the
contest to new, fresh faces. 1 Now, however,
there is a greater likelihood of the champ dying
in between matches than actually losing one.

Because of such odds, most viable contenders
are content to wait for the day the champ
meets with such a fate before they put on their
gloves and step into the ring. Challengers
once brought fierce competition into these
matches, but the most they muster now is
usually only token opposition. The judges of
these contests consistently declare the champ
the overwhelming winner.
Admittedly, the above analogy is not
perfect. The outcomes of elections, unlike
boxing matches, are influenced by more factors
than head-to-head comparisons and candidate
showdowns.
Partisanship, the political
environment, and a host of other variables
come into play when two candidates vie for
the same elected office. However, the fact
remains that competition has all but disap-
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peared from congressional races in America.
The "reigning champion" has an undisputed
advantage over challengers.
Back&roond
Numerous studies have attempted to
assess the importance of incumbency and other
factors of candidate image in congressional
elections. For many years, the consensus was
that congressional elections were largely
decided on the basis of national political
forces. Supporters of this thesis characterized
congressional elections in the following three
categories: (1) partisan affairs in which party
affiliation was the only important predictor
of voting behavior, (2) referenda on the
incumbent president's job performance, and
(3) the means through which voters could
either reward or punish members of Congress
for the condition of the economy (Niemi and
Weisberg 1984, 199). More recent research,
however, indicates that congressional elections
may indeed be more susceptible to local
influences than earlier studies had led political
scientists to believe. Much of this new
research rests on the assumption that candidate
qualities are important to voter choices and,
as a rule, incumbents are better known and
better liked (Niemi and Weisberg 1984, 204).
My thesis, and the impetus for writing
this paper, is an extension of these assumptions. I contend that the trappings of incumbency have allowed incumbents to become
better known and better liked than challengers,
thereby causing the demise of competition in
congressional elections. While this thesis is
accepted fairly well among political scientists,
there is room for elaboration. Indeed, the
trends in congressional elections mentioned
above have led to a heightened level of interest
in the study of candidate appeal and image;
however, most of the resulting research has
focussed on presidential candidates and their

campaigns. Furthermore, because relatively
few studies have been done to assess the link
between the advantages of incumbency and
the establishment of positive images by
congressional incumbents, there is reason to
examine this problem.
As I have noted briefly, there are a
host of factors which influence the outcome
of congressional elections. I contend, however, that the image and appeal of candidates
are becoming increasingly important factors
of voting behavior. This, coupled with the
fact that incumbents are far better equipped
to establish positive images in the minds of
voters than are challengers, leads to a serious
discrepancy in the viability of incumbent and
challenger candidates. My research indicates
that the major factor contributing to this
disparity is the huge advantage incumbents
enjoy in the fund raising aspect of electioneering.
In order to establish this relationship,
I have defined four objectives for this paper.
First, I will review the existing literature on
candidate appeal and image. Second, because
of the lack of a systematic approach to this
area of study, I will present my model of
candidate appeal and image. Third, I will
address the advantages of incumbency (with
an emphasis on the ability to raise money),
especially those which clearly give an advantage to incumbents in the campaign process.
Furthermore, I will show how these advantages
help incumbents to project positive images of
themselves in the minds of the electorate. I
will also assess the plausibility of tying these
images to voter choice. Fourth, and last, I
will elaborate on my argument which links
candidate image to voter choice, paying
specific attention to the theoretical bases of
my thesis and examine some models of voter
rationality. Having accomplished these tasks,
I will make some general conclusions about
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congressional races and offer some recommendations for reform.

PART I
Candidate Appeal and ImaKe
There has been relatively little research
done in the area of the appeal and image of
congressional candidates. There have been,
however, some very important developments
which would be foolish to overlook. Even
more important for the purposes of this paper,
though, many of these studies serve as both
a basis and launching pad for my own research
and subsequent conclusions.
First of all, I should address the school
of thought which rests on the assertion that
congressional races are, in fact, not local,
candidate-centered affairs at all, but nationally
driven political events. Proponents of this
school of thought point to early studies, based
on the 1958 Michigan election surveys, which
showed that voters, in general, knew little of
the candidates running for Congress in their
districts. This, in fact, is true. Most voters
still cannot recall the name of either candidate
when asked by pollsters. This fact, along with
other supporting evidence, has led many
researchers and political scientists to conclude
that congressional elections are not decided
on the basis of candidate saliency but on the
other, national factors mentioned above
(partisanship, presidential popularity, and the
status of the economy).
More recent studies and research,
though, have tended to refute this concept of
congressional elections. Much of the research
now shows that candidates are much more
important than was originally thought (Niemi
and Weisberg 1984,204). At the same time,
it is clear that incumbents are generally better
known and better liked. Even supporters of
the congressional elections as national events
thesis like Jacobson and Kernell admit that

on the individual level, there is little evidence
that voters actuall y base their voting decisions
on things like the state of their personal
economic situation (Jacobson and Kernell
1982).
Further contributions to the study of
candidate image by Mann and Wolfinger
support the idea that congressional elections
are influenced by local factors--especially the
qualities of the candidates (Mann and Wolfinger 1980). Mann and Wolfinger include things
like incumbency, name recognition, reputation,
and "preference" or favorability of candidates
in their discussion of candidate appeal and
image. In fact, they argue that voters do not
base their decisions solely on partisanship or
incumbency status as some authors have
concluded. What is more likely to happen,
they argue, is that voters will assess each
candidate, compare them, and choose the one
that they like best (Mann and Wolfinger 1980,
280). Consequently, even a candidate who
is perceived as "neutral" (neither negatively
nor positively) may win if their opponent's
image is sufficiently negative (see Box 1).
Mann and Wolfinger conclude that
candidate image and appeal are very important
predictors for the outcomes of congressional
elections (288). To support this contention,
they explain that most voters recognize2 the
names of both candidates in congressional
races (virtually all voters recognize the
incumbent's name and about two-thirds
recognize the challenger's name). Furthermore, most voters can also attribute qualities
and values to each candidate. Though these
voter perceptions are based on thin information
and are highly personalized, they have a
dramatic impact on voter decisions (Mann and
Wolfinger 1980, 288).
One of the most comprehensive looks
at candidate image was published in 1976.
Nimmo and Savage, in their book Candidates
and Their Images, concluded through their
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research of presidential, congressional, and
other elections that candidate image is a
function of both candidate "projects" and voter
perceptions (31). They further concluded that
candidate images are based on what voters
perceive of each candidate's actions and traits
(50-63). In fact, because of this perceptual
model of voter imaging, they contend that
candidates may often have more than one
image in the eyes of the electorate (73). In
the end, they conclude that their work was

but a beginning in the area of candidate appeal
and image. Based on their research, though,
they concluded that image does effect voter
choice, but the link between the two was not
yet fully understood (208-9).

A Model for Candidate Appeal and ImaKe
The problem that Nimmo and Savage
pointed out is still largely unsolved. Sheer
logic will confirm the idea that candidate

Bill Orton vs. Karl Snow: Who's Image was Better?
Reasons for Voting
for Bill Orton

Reuons
~ For

CaDdidate
• Against Opponent
[JOther

14"

Reasons for Voting
for Karl Snow

Reasons

o For Candidate
• ApiDst Opponent

ClOtbel'

14"

Box 1.

In 1990, Bill Orton upset Karl
Snow in the race for Utah's 3rd
Congressional District seal Many
observers have argued, though, that
Orton's victory was more due to
Snow's negative image than to
Orton's positive image.
Notice that the graphs at the left
show a much larger percentage of
Orton's votes as votes cast against
Snow than vice versa. It is quite
possible that Orton was viewed as
neutral because he was fairly
unknown. Snow's image, however,
had become increasingly negative
after the primary. Apparently, a
candidate need not have a strong,
positive image in order to win--it
only bas to be more positive than
the opponent's image.
( Data taken from KBYU's 1990
Utah Colleges Exit Poll)
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image has an impact on voting behavior.
However, it is possible to show this causality
with some degree of certainty. In this pursuit,
under the tutelage of Professors David
Magleby and Bud Scruggs, I have constructed
a model of candidate image and appeal. This
three-part model accounts for, in my estimation, each facet of a candidate's image. The
model is diagramed in Figure 1.
While the chart is, for the most part,
self-explanatory, I will briefly describe the
reasoning behind the model. As I mentioned,
I believe that this model accounts for all

aspects of candidate appeal and image. In the
two boxes, I have summarized the characteristics and experiences of candidates which
makes them what they are. (Because of the
"political" nature of candidates and candidacy,
I thought it logical to separate "personal
appeal" from "political identity. ") These
candidate traits are communicated to voters
directly, through the media, and through
candidate campaigns. Through the campaign,
the candidate will attempt to convey a positive,
tailored image to the voting public. Not only
do candidates seek to accomplish this goal
through paid media

A MODEL FOR CANDIDATE APPEAL AND IMAGE
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and staged events, but they also attempt to
control how the news media projects their
images.
Admittedly, this is not a perfect model.
All races are not alike. The less visible the
race, the less likely voters are to know much
about the candidates involved. Additionally,
depending on the severity or intensity of any
one of the candidate's characteristics, the
campaign may have only a minimal effect in
projecting a positive image. For example,
David Duke is currently trying to portray
himself as the best choice for the president
of the United States in 1992. However, his
affiliation with the Ku Klux Klan, a huge part
of his political identity, will undoubtedly
obscure the images he attempts to project
through his campaign. 3 Furthermore, if
candidates attempt to represent themselves as
something that they are not, or try to obscure
an embarrassing part of their past, the media
will most likely alert the voters to the candidate's "real" identity.
As the literature indicates, though, a
candidate's image is an important factor of
voter choice, and my model begins to explain
why that is the case. Most authors agree that
candidate image and appeal have a direct
impact on voter choice. In fact, many scholars
argue that it is at least the most important short
term predictor of voting behavior (Flanigan
and Zingale 1991, 114). The ability to project
a positive image is a very important factor in
campaigning.
These conclusions naturally lead to the
following question: What kind of candidates
have the best images? Secondly, why do these
candidate's have images that are more positive
than others? The remainder of this paper will
be devoted to answering these two questions.

PART II
The Incumbent Advanta&e
The answer to the first of the two
question just posed is clear. Incumbents are,
by far, better known and better liked than their
challengers. Incumbents are almost always
reelected.
Moreover, they usually win
handily. Vital Statistics on Congress, a
publication of Congressional Quarterly Press,
puts incumbents who sought reelection to
House seats in 1990 into the following three
categories: (1) those who won more than 60 %
of the vote, (2) those who won less than 60 %
of the vote but were still reelected, and (3)
those incumbents who were defeated. In 1990,
312 out of the 435 races were won by incumbents in the first category while only fifteen
fell into the third category (Ornstein, Mann,
and Malbin 1991,80-1). Why are incumbents
so formidable? Simply put, it is because they
have an overwhelming advantage in terms of
political firepower.

The Perks of Office
Members of Congress have a vast
number of resources at their disposal. In
researching these resources, David Vogler
found that the "perks" of office--things like
personal staff allowances for members of
Congress (around fifteen staffers are allowed
for Representatives and about twice that many
for Senators), the franking privilege, and travel
allowances that permit congressmen to return
home nearly every weekend--cost the taxpayers
between $500,000 and $1 million per congressperson per year (1988, 88). Vogler specifically points to the increasing staff sizes, which
have permitted members of Congress to run
state and district offices for constituent
services, as a major source of advantage for
incumbents (224). While Vogler's assertion
that the main purpose of these home offices
is to help incumbents get reelected (225) may
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be a little strong, the political benefits they
provide for incumbents are tremendous.
Besides those listed above, there are many
other resources which contribute to incumbent
advantages.
Because each of these perks and
advantages offers unique opportunities to
members of Congress which allow them to
build positive images and increase their
advantage over challengers, they deserve to
be addressed individually.
While these
advantages are numerous where the formation
and development of candidate appeal and image
are concerned, the most important advantages
are constituency service, the franking privilege,
time, exposure and reputation, and the ability
to raise money.
Constituency Service. In his book Congress:
Keystone of the Washington Establishment,
Morris Fiorina adds to the weight of Vogler's
conclusions about the ability of incumbents
to provide services to their constituencies
(1989). In the newly added Chapter 11 of his
second edition, though, Fiorinaclarifies some
misunderstandings about his arguments. He
makes it clear that, by no means is constituent
service the deciding factor leading to the domination of congressional elections by incumbents. In fact, he contends that constituency
service accounts for only about five to eight
percentage points of an incumbent's advantage
over challengers (99). He argues further that
the polling resources, the ability to raise
money, and the generally poor quality of
challengers are other, possibly more dramatic,
advantages or factors of incumbent domination
(99-100).
Still, constituent service is one of the
best tools a member of Congress can use to
build a positive image in his or her district.
Not onl y do the people who receive assistance
from the congressperson' s office become
endeared to the officeholder, but they spread

the story of how they were helped among their
friends. Indeed, it is as George Will once
wrote: "Incumbents win because Americans
despise Congress but love their particular
Congressman, who toils tirelessly to deliver
services" (Will 1990, 236). Furthermore, the
advantages of constituent service become even
more pronounced the longer a congressperson
is in office. Not only does the aggregate of
services rendered amass a sizeable support
base among the electorate as time passes, but
a senior member of Congress is better
equipped to supply even more services. Jewell
and Patterson maintain that the seniority
system, especially in the House, leads to a
Congress where the longer members are in
office, the greater is their ability to "deliver"
and, therefore, get reelected (Jewell and
Patterson 1986, 116).

The Franking Privilege. Direct mailings are
one of the most touted campaign tactics of
recent times. While there are some limits on
the use of the franking privilege in Congress,
members send out reams of letters each year
to their constituents, "free of charge"--which
is the literal meaning ofJrank. While his study
is somewhat dated, David Mayhew found that
out of the 158 House members who were
elected in the mid-1960s, 121 said that they
sent out regular news letters to their constituents, and eighty-nine periodically sent out
mail questionnaires (Mayhew 1974,50). Since
then, the use of franked mail has become even
more pervasive. 4 Some members of Congress
go as far as to send letters of congratulations
and information on baby care to the new
parents in their districts. All of these mailings
add up to a powerful campaign tool. Challengers, on the other hand, must pay thousands
of dollars each time they want to cover the
district with letters.
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Time. While time is not an exclusive gift given
to members of Congress (they still have only
twenty four hours in each day), incumbents
have a clear advantage in the amount of time
they have available for campaigning. While
in office, a member of the House or Senate
spends a large amount of his or her time
preparing for the next election. Most begin
serious preparations at least a year in advance
(Salmore and Salmore 1985, 71). Scruggs
contends that the power of office allows
candidates to mold their images over time
(Scruggs 1991). To support this notion, he
points to the efforts of Orrin Hatch, a Utah
Senator, to increase his support among women.
According to some post-election polling,
Hatch's consultants found that he wasn't faring
too well with women. Consequently, the
Senator has, for the past six years, shifted his
focus to women's and children's issues. He
has sponsored an annual Women's Conference
in Salt Lake City and has taken issue stances
that, according to survey research, women
are more responsive to than men. s Members
of Congress are, in effect, constantly campaigning while their challengers are not blessed
with nearly as much time to mold their images
among voters.

Exposure and Reputation. As previously
noted, incumbents are generally better known
and better liked than their challengers. Much
of this is due to their ability to communicate
directly, and indirectly, with constituents
(Salmore and Salmore 1985, 61). While the
franking privilege contributes significantly to
this advantage, other facets of incumbency
are also important and contribute to further
incumbent-challenger disparities. For example,
incumbents enjoy a decisive margin in name
recognition over challengers. One survey
found that incumbents had a 92 % name
recognition while challengers were at a much
lower 54% (Jewell and Patterson 1986, 44).

Once an incumbent's name is well known, a
relative lack of news coverage can also
contribute to a positive candidate image.
Scruggs argues that one of the most important
aspects of incumbent advantage is that, once
the member of Congress has established a
positive image, most voters feel that "no news
is good news" (1991). Voters are willing to
assume that if they hear nothing, the representative or senator is doing their job, and
doing it well. This is especially true for
members of Congress who have won their first
reelection bid (Scruggs 1991).
Media coverage, while potentially
devastating, can build and strengthen an
incumbent's positive image as well. Many
opportunities are available for members of
Congress to get "free" or "earned" media
coverage. Mayhew's study found that fortyeight of the Representatives he interviewed
wrote regular columns in local newspapers
or magazines, and another eighty-two regularly
reported home by means of radio or television
(Mayhew 1974, 50). At least one Congressman
has even run his own radio program (51).
Members of Congress are able to
contact large numbers of voters through the
means listed above. Many congresspersons
even make a habit of appearing at social events
unannounced or speaking at "non-political"
functions. One congressman is said to have
never lost a precinct where he gave a high
school commencement speech (Mayhew 1974,
50). Activities such as these, combined with
campaign activities (to be discussed later),
allow incumbents to contact a surprisingly
large number of voters. In contrast, American
National Elections Study (ANES) data shows
that most voters are never contacted by
challengers (see Figure 2). In fact, congressional incumbents are able to contact almost 90 %
of voters before the election while challengers
contact less than 45 %. In other words, about
twice as many voters have had contact with
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the incumbent than the challenger. Since
challengers are rarely even able to contact a
majority of voters, it follows that they are
seldom able to convince a majority of voters
to fire the incumbent and hire the challenger.
This discrepancy in voter contacts
increases the longer a member of Congress
is in office. Obviously, the longer a congressperson serves, the better they become

known by their constituents. Mann found that
voters, in response to specific questions about
candidate traits, chose the "Don't Know"
response only 15-25 % of the time in regard
to long term incumbents. The numbers went
up to 20-45% for new incumbents, 40-60%
for challengers with prior exposure, and 6075% for new challengers (Mann 1984,262).
By utilizing the advan

Number of Contacts by Candidates
% of Voters Contacted by:

Challengers

Incumbents

I CONTACTS

3.5

4

16.5

(N-3948)
(Data

Fiqure 2.

tn. ANES 1990)

(N=4742)
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reported figures will reveal an alarming trend-challengers are being out spent buy a large
margin. Figure 3 shows incumbent and
challenger spending in U. S. House races from
1976 through 1990 (the figures are in mean
net dollars). The graph illustrates two clear
trends. First, the overall level of campaign
spending has increased every year for more
than a decade. In fact, rises in campaign
spending have exceeded the overall inflation
rate (Abramowitz 1991, 49).
However, the second trend, which is
not completely illustrated by the graph, is that
challenger spending has decreased

tages I have described, a member of Congress
can foster positive images while becoming
increasingly well known. The more established an incumbent's image becomes, the
more difficult it becomes, under normal
circumstances, (; to change that image.

The Ability to Raise Money
The ability of incumbents to raise
money may be their biggest advantage over
challengers in congressional races. Due to
strict campaign expenditure reporting laws,
there is very good data on both challenger and
incumbent spending. Merely glancing at the
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sharply. The drop in challenger spending,
which started in 1984, is even more dramatic
when inflation is controlled for. Adjusted for
inflation, overall challenger expenditures
dropped 30% during the 1980s (Abramowitz
1991, 51). While House challengers were,
on the average, only out spent by about
$30,000 dollars, or 36%, in 1976, they were
out spent by an average of almost $290,000,
or 73%, in 1990.
Similar spending trends are apparent
in Senate races as well. Figure 4 shows
campaign expenditures for Senate races from
1976 through 1990. Here again, the overall
cost of running a campaign has skyrocketed
from about $625,000 for incumbents in 1976

to more than $3.5 million in 1990 (the figures
are in mean net dollars). Challenger expenditures have also increased, but not at the same
rate. In 1976, challengers were out spent by
only about $160,000, or 30%. But, by 1990,
the gap had grown to more than $1.7 million,
or 52 %. While both challenger and incumbent
expenditures dropped in 1990, the proportion
is essentially unchanged.
The reasons for this discrepancy in the
ability to raise money are simple. People most
often donate their money to the candidate that
is most likely to win. This is especially true
of Political Action Committees which, in 1988,
gave 75 % of all their
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contributions to incumbents (Magleby and
Nelson 1990,53-4). PAC money accounted
for almost 40% of all House campaign
expenditures in the same year.

PARTm
The Implications of the Incumbent Advanta&e
While it is obvious that incumbents are
better equipped to run election campaigns than
are challengers, it is more difficult to assess
the impact of this disparity on candidate
salience. What is the overall effect of these
discrepancies between incumbents and challengers?

Election Results
The most important result of the
discrepancy between the fund raising abilities
of incumbents and challengers is the outcome
of elections. As previously stated, incumbents
almost always win their reelection bids, and
they usually win by large margins. In 1988,
fifty-six of the 435 House races were uncontested, and 70% of the 435 were won by
incumbents who won more than 65 % of the
votes cast (Will 1990, 236). A grand total
of five incumbents (about 2 %) seeking
reelection were defeated in the same year
(Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1990, 79). In
1990, there were seventy House incumbents
who ran unopposed (Ornstein, Mann, and
Malbin 1991, 74). There were even three
unopposed Senate races, where competition
is usually much stronger (Ornstein, Mann, and
Malbin 1991, 78).
This trend toward incumbent domination in congressional races was recognized by
Mayhew in the early 1970s (Mayhew 1974)
and was reassessed by Fiorina (1989). Both
authors came to similar conclusions--the
"marginal", or closely contested, races for

House seats were becoming a thing of the past,
and, to a lesser degree, the same trend was
appearing in the Senate. Fiorina attributes
this trend to the advantages of incumbency-especially constituent service--and the declining
strength of challengers (1989, 17-28).

The Absence of Strong Challengers
One development that cannot technically
be called an advantage of incumbency which
has, nonetheless, contributed to the entrenchment of incumbents in Congress is the lack
of strong challengers. However, in pointing
to this trend as a cause of incumbent domination, it is important to point out that this
argument is somewhat tautological. It's the
same old question with a new twist--Which
came first? The strong incumbent or the weak
challenger?
Much like the "chicken or the egg"
question, this query may never be fully
resolved. However, one thing is quite clear-the trend toward weak challengers feeds the
already formidable bias toward incumbents
in elections. Jacobson supports this notion
when he points out that incumbency alone does
not account for high reelection rates. They
are a function of both the highly positive
images of incumbents and the comparatively
much more negative images of challengers
(Niemi and Weisberg 1984,204). But, why
are challenger images so much worse than that
of incumbents?
A recent article by Banks and Kiewiet
presents convincing evidence that weak
challengers7 are more likely to run against
incumbents, while strong challengers are more
inclined to wait for an open-seat race (Banks
and Kiewiet 1989, 1013). Their reasoning
behind this conclusion is straightforward: weak
candidates have a better chance of beating an
incumbent than winning a major party's
nomination in an open seat race, while the
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odds for strong candidates are reversed (1014).
This scenario becomes somewhat of a selffulfilling prophecy because, for the most part,
"weaks" confine their election bids to races
against incumbents, thereby avoiding a tough
primary against a strong candidate. Likewise,
strong candidates sit it out until their chances
of winning are maximized. When weak candidates run against incumbents, they win
significantly more often than when they run
in open-seat races (Banks and Kiewiet 1989,
1(08).
The inability to raise the large sums
of money required to run a competitive race

against an incumbent is also a major deterrent
for even fairly strong candidates. Abramowitz
argues that this fact contributes directly to
incumbent dominated electoral success (1991,
34).

The Effects of Money on Electoral Competition
Having established the fact that
challengers cannot raise money with near the
success enjoyed by incumbents, I now turn
to an explanation of the direct effects of this
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discrepancy. First of all, let's take another
look at the 1988 election results for House
races. As I stated earlier, Vital Statistics put
incumbents who ran for reelection into three
categories: those who won by large margins,
those who won close races, and those who
lost (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1991, 8081). When the margins these incumbents won
by is compared with the margin by which they
out spent their challengers, an interesting trend
appears (see Figure 5). Incumbents who won
their reelection bids with 60% or more or the
votes out spent their challengers six to one,
with average expenditures of $362,000 to $61,000, for a difference of over $300,000 (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1991, 80). Those
who won reelection with less than 60% of the
vote out spent challengers by an even larger
amount ($615,000 to $248,000 for a difference
of $367,(00), but by a smaller percentage-they spent 2.5 times as much as their challengers. Even incumbents that lost spent more
than their challengers, but the margin is about
the same--$674,000 to $445,000, for a
difference of $229,000, or 1.5 times as much
as challengers.
In assessing this data, it is important
to keep two things in mind. First, of the 435
House races in 1990, incumbents in the first
category were often unopposed or only faced
token opposition. This accounts for the
markedly low spending levels of the challengers they faced. Second, while it is apparent
that incumbent spending is a function of
challenger expenditures, it is also true that high
incumbent expenditures are usually the result
of political trouble and low favorable ratings.
Furthermore, when an incumbent is in "trouble, " the challenger's chances of raising money
are much better because potential donors pay
attention to polls. The problem is, though,
that there were 406 incumbents who sought
reelection in 1990 and only 23 % of those won
less than 60% of the votes, and overall, 96%
of them won (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin

1990, 59 and 80). Competition was almost
nonexistent, and very few incumbents were
in the kind of "trouble" that would have
opened the door to challenger competition.
While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to establish which is the deciding factor
of competition--challenger money or a decline
in incumbent image--it is important to keep
in mind that both are important in races where
incumbents actually lose.
Abramowitz argues that a challenger's
ability to get information to the public and take
on the incumbents image is direct! y connected
to his or her ability to raise money (1991, 54).
In fact, he argues
Electoral accountability requires effective
competition. It is not enough to allow challengers to criticize the performance of incumbent
officeholders. Unless challengers have the
resources to communicate with the pUblic, voters
will not have the information they need to make
an informed choice .... Political stagnation and
one-party rule are the consequences of an
electoral process which renders incumbents
almost invulnerable to defeat (54).

He also points out that it is more important
than ever for challengers to spend large
amounts of money if they hope to beat an
incumbent (51). According to his research,
challenger spending is now the best indicator
of competitiveness8 in congressional races
(44). Furthermore, he asserts that in addition
to the increasing inability of challengers to
keep up with incumbent spending (see Figures
3 and 4), challenger expenditures, dollar for
dollar, now have less impact on an incumbent's
margin in polls and election results than ever
(52).
King and Gelman further contend that
electoral responsiveness to challenger campaigns against House incumbents has decreased
dramatically since 1946 (1991, 130). They
attribute 30% of this decline in responsiveness
directly to incumbency, while suggesting that
the rest of the change may be due to the large
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number of powerful candidates with vast
resources who were drawn into congressional
races after World War II due to the heightened
desirability of elected office (130).
Even incumbents without vast resources, though, are able to raise large sums
of money, which allows them to use the media
and other means to have "repetitive persuasive
communication with likely voters," which,
according to Beaudry and Schaeffer, in their
book Winning State and Local Elections, is
the key to electoral success (1986, 2). Mann
and Wolfinger also come to a similar conclusion. An incumbent's advantage in image can
largely be attributed to the ability of incumbents to contact voters (see Figure 2) (Mann
and Wolfinger 1980,283). In order to contact
thousands of voters, a candidate needs a
sizeable amount of money. If these contacts
can be made, though, images are planted and
voting decisions are affected.

Incumbent and Challenger Campaigns
Due to their decisive advantage in fund
raising, incumbents generally have better
organized, better run, and more effective
campaigns. However, there are some disadvantages to being an incumbent. As I indicate
in note number five on the Orrin Hatch story,
some positions taken or votes cast as a member
of Congress can have a negative impact on
an incumbent's image. Furthermore, incumbents, to a large degree, are limited in their
ability to project carefully crafted images of
themselves through campaigns. While a
challenger's "canvass" is blank, ready to be
painted by creative consultants and campaign
managers, the image on the incumbent's
canvass is relatively complete, leaving only
room for "touching up" (Scruggs 1991).
Another factor which may hurt incumbents
somewhat is the "throw the bums out" mood
which is spreading throughout the American
electorate. 9 Furthermore, voters receive

impressions of candidates from sources other
than the candidate's campaign (see Figure 1),
and more scrutiny is usually given to the
incumbents record in the media.
Nonetheless, incumbents still enjoy a
decisive advantage in campaigning. Researchers have concluded that this advantage
does, in fact, impact voting behavior. In three
case studies, Mann found that voters responded
to campaign efforts to portray crafted images
of candidates (1984). Voters were also found
to be responsive to a campaign's efforts to
characterize the opponent (Niemi and Weisberg
1984,262-3). In these instances, the "political
dialogue" of the candidates became part of
the public's perceived image of them, and
consequently, part of the rationale behind the
choices made on election day.
One related aspect of a candidate's
image which I have not addressed is job
performance. According to ANES data from
1974 to 1988, when voters disapprove of the
incumbent's job performance, they are more
than three times as likely to vote for the
challenger. However, only about 10% of
voters polled stated that they disapproved of
the incumbent's performance. Overall positive
ratings of incumbents are common in preelection polls and exit surveys, and it is not easy
for challengers to overcome these popular
images. More ANES data shows that even
when a challenger is rated as "hot" on the
candidate salience thermometer, they only win
12 % of the time.
The visibility of the challenger is an
essential ingredient of competitiveness. When
challengers wage competitive campaigns
(mostly due to, for some reason, an increased
ability to raise money), knowledge of both
candidates increases and challengers do much
better (Niemi and Weisberg 1984, 263).
Conversely, incumbents have a clear advantage
in obscure elections.
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PART IV

The Stability of Candidate Ima&es
The evidence which I have presented
substantiates my model of candidate appeal
and image. It also lends support to a model
of voter decision making. There is considerable evidence supporting the idea that the
more established a candidate's image becomes,
the more difficult that image is to change.
The conclusions drawn by researchers in this
area supports the assertion that voters, upon
receiving information about a candidate, filter
the infonnation is through existing infonnation,
instead of viewing it objectively. This
contributes to stable candidate images among
voters. One possible way of thinking of voter
imaging and decision making is illustrated in
Figure 6. Because there is nothing obvious
about this model, I will first explain my
reasoning behind it.

The Voter Thought Process
Some recent studies of public opinion
and voting behavior have focussed on the
thought processes that people go through when
they receive information and form opinions
and images of candidates. Lodge, McGraw,
and Stroh, all of The University of New YorkStony Brook, have developed an "impressiondriven" model of voting behavior and opinion
formulation (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh
1989). Their model holds that "evaluations
are formed and updated 'on-line' as information is encountered" (399). The implication
of their assertion is that voters only selectively
rely on the candidate infonnation they have
been exposed to. In fact, they argue that
voters make judgements of the information
they receive in light of the information that
they have already taken in. Because voters
perceive political information selectively, the
"mix of evidence available in memory [about
candidates] is a nonveridicial representation

of the information to which subjects are
exposed" (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989,
399). Voter choice, then, becomes a function
of cognitive perception, which filters new
information through existing beliefs and
attitudes.
Further supporting evidence for this
model is provided by Conover and Feldman
who argue that, even though candidates are
ambiguous and very seldom take strong issue
stances, voters will often associate issue
stances and ideologies with candidates (1989).
Their contention is that voters, based on their
individual political beliefs and minuscule
candidate cues, infer the existence of these
candidate stances (312). In other words, a
voter's beliefs about the specific issue stances
taken by candidates are more a function of
the voter's inferences than of reality. Consequently, once images of candidates are fonned,
voters will view new information through the
filter of those images. They will then make
inferences about the newly encountered facts
in order to bring them in line with their
existing opinions.
Flanigan and Zingale also examine this
phenomenon of voting behavior in their book

Political Behavior ofthe American Electorate
(1991). They point out that individuals are
unwilling to accept facts that are contrary to
their opinions or beliefs (145). Consequently,
people have several defense mechanisms
against "the potential dissonance represented
by new information that conflicts with their
existing attitudes" (145). These mechanisms
include selective exposure, or ignoring pieces
of conflicting infonnation, selective perception,
or misinterpreting the infonnation or rejecting
it by discounting the credibility of the source,
compartmentalization, or not linking the new
infonnation with the previously held, conflicting attitude or opinion, and rationalization,
or developing a false explanation for the new
information in order to avoid the real one
(145). Flanigan and Zingale also argue that
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strongly held beliefs are more closely protected
by these mechanisms than others; therefore,
political views are fairly changeable. However, I point to their conclusion that "typically,
individuals will change dissonant patterns in
the easiest way" possible (145). Because of
this tendency, it is likely that the longer an
image of a candidate is held, and the more
an incumbent is able to reinforce that image,

the more filters there are for new information
to pass through. It, therefore, becomes harder
to improve or attack that image, under normal
circumstances, the longer they are held.
The way voters perceive candidates
and make voting decisions about them, then,
can be thought as illustrated in Figure 6.
Notice that the incumbent/challenger variable
is prior to all of the means through
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which voters receive candidate images. The
model also takes into account the fact that
campaign efforts are not solely aimed at
directly influencing voters but also at influencing the way the media projects the candidate's image.
PART V

Conclusion and Recommendations
Competition is a thing of the past in
congressional elections. No longer does the
United States of America have a citizen
legislature where men and women go, for a
tum, to serve as representatives of the people,
and then return to their constituencies and
allow others their "tum." While some arguments can be made in favor of the professionalization of Congress, both fiscal and
electoral accountability have gone out the back
door as incumbency has dead-bolted the front
door. Abramowitz was right. Electoral
accountability does demand competition; but
incumbents are working harder than ever, with
higher rates of success than ever, to make sure
that competition doesn't resurface.
In response to a seemingly unresponsive, incumbent dominated electoral process,
American voters have become caught up in
a populist "throw the bums out, reelect no
one!" sentiment. Three states have now placed
term limits on their state office holders.
Oklahoma's voters passed a ballot proposition
in November of 1990 that limits the terms of
state legislators to a total of twelve years
(Moss 1990). In the same year, California's
Proposition 140 won the support of voters,
thereby limiting the terms of state assemblymen to six years and state senators to eight.
It also eliminates legislator pensions and
slashes $60 million from the state legislature's
operating fund (Uhler 1990, 1).10 In Colorado, 71 % of the voters approved a measure
setting an eight year limit for state elected
officials. Moreover, it also limited the terms

of the state's members of Congress to twelve
years (Moss 1990). A similar measure was
narrowly defeated in the state of Washington
in November of 1991. 11
While the idea of term limits on the
members of Congress is overwhelmingly
popular, it might cause more problems than
it would solve. In an article in the Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, Ornstein argues
that there isn't an "easy way to take arrogance
and excessive ambition out of politics [and]
bring enlightened amateurism back to governance" (l991a). Limiting terms, he asserts,
would only fill members of Congress with
more "corrupt ambition," as they begin
campaigning for the Senate the day they enter
the House, or begin "cozying up" to lawyers
and lobbyists in order to secure jobs for
themselves after their limited number of terms
had expired. Magleby points out that term
limits would essentially increase congressional
terms to the newly limited number of years
(1991). This would become the reality, he
contends, because most candidates will opt
to wait until their chances of winning are the
greatest--they will wait until the incumbent
is forced to retire so they can run for an open
seat. 12 Magleby further contends that term
limits would make the larger states even more
powerful in the House. One of Ornstein's best
arguments against term limits is that the power
of the members of Congress in general, not
just that of the small states, would be diminished, and the other branches of government
and the massive congressional support staff
would gain power proportionately (1991a).
While all of these assertions are
enough, by themselves, to cast doubt on the
viability of the call for congressional term
limits, I believe that there is an even better
argument against them: they are anti-democratic. George Will was only partially right
when he said that "incumbents are entrenched
by democratic choices" (Will 1991, 236). If
voters don't know what all of their choices
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are, democratic decisions are impossible.
Instead of limiting the choices of voters then,
moves should be made to expand them by
instilling competition in congressional races.
Recommendations

If term limits are not the answer to
solving the problems of incumbent domination,
we must tum elsewhere for a solution. As
Ornstein concludes, not only would tenn limits
"sock it to" incumbents, but they would sock
it to the rest of us too (l991a). The aim of
political science, in my estimation, is not to
merely understand politics, but to offer
solutions to problems that will better the
human condition.
My recommendation,
however, is nota "quick fix," but along term
solution that is in agreement with established
principles of American democracy and
republicanism. The real need lies in putting
competition back into congressional races.
One of the best ways to do this would be to
finance campaigns with public funds.
Most challengers never raise enough
money to break the threshold of visibility,
which is evidenced by the low number of
voters who were contacted by challengers and
who recognize their names. If the playing
field were to be leveled at least where fund
raising is concerned, challengers might fare
much better. Incumbents would still enjoy
numerous advantages, but there would be some
semblance of competition. In his aforementioned article on competitiveness in House
elections, Abramowitz presented a model
which simulated the 1984 House races as if
there were publicly financed elections. He
concluded that as many as forty-five incumbents could have been defeated (1991, 52).
The problem though, he points out, is that the
level of competition wasn't reached in his
model until each candidate was allotted
$800,000. Members of Congress would be
hard pressed to give that much money to any

one who decided to challenge them for their
seat. Furthermore, selling such an idea to the
tax-paying public would not be an easy task.
In light of these obstacles, Abramowitz
suggests a system of public financing where
candidates who can first raise $200,000 would
then be eligible for matching funds from a
public campaign pool, similar to the way
presidential elections are financed (52).
This idea may be far from perfect, but
it appears to be the best alternative. At the
same time, without other reforms, like a
balanced budget requirement for the national
government and some changes in the seniority
and committee systems of Congress, the impact
of public financing might be limited. Many
opponents of public financing further argue
that the scales would still be tipped heavily
in favor of incumbents. I agree. Public
financing alone will not solve all of the
problems this nation faces; however, it would
certainly be a step in the right direction.

NOTES

1. While there was an increase in the number of voluntary
retirements from the House during the 1970s, in the year
in which that decade saw the most retirements--there were
49 in 1978--there were still incumbents in 86 % of the
435 races. See Vital Statistics on Congress. 1991-1992,
pg.60.
2. When voters are asked to give the names of the
candidates running for office, they are often unable to.
However, when asked if they recognize the candidates'
names, they usually do. They can also then asses the
traits of each candidate.
3. Duke was an active neo-Nazi during the high school
and college years and was the grand wizard of the Ku
Klux Klan in 1975. He now asks voters to forget these
"tiresome references" to his past and accept him as a
candidate for low taxes and less government. (See the
November 18, 1991 edition of Newsweek.)
4. Since 1974, the number of pieces of franked mail has
doubled, and even tripled in given years. The highest
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number of-mailings was in 1984 when 924.6 million pieces
were franked at the cost of $117.3 million (Ornstein 1990,
139 and 160).

somewhere in between, into his model for determining
competitiveness and found that there was virtually no
difference in the resulting calculations.

5. Such tactics can amount to nothing if a representative
of senator takes an opposing position somewhere down
the road. Hatch did just that in the Clarence Thomas hearings and his favorable ratings among women dropped
overnight.

9. See Tod Lindberg's ·Putting Incumbents on Notice,·
in Insight, 8 October, 1990, p. 64.

6. Obviously, a scandal or revelation of improprieties
can quickly destroy any candi-date's image.

11. For a complete explanation of the Washington
proposal, see Timothy Egan, • Campaign on Term Limits
Breeds Unusual Alliances,· New York Times, 31 October
1991, AI.

7. Banks and Kiewiet define a weak candidate as one
with little or no prior political experience or exposure.
8.
Abramowitz later incorporated Congressional
Quarterly's 7 -point scale, in which congressional districts
are ranked as ·Safe Democrat,· ·Safe Republican,· or

10. The California measure was contested and subsequently upheld in the Supreme Court (Ornstein 1991a).

12. This argument is supported by the research of Banks
and Kiewiet. See page 22.
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